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MOBY-DICK AS CORPORATE CATASTROPHE: 




“This is my substitute for pistol and ball.” 
 
– Herman Melville 




Some works of art suffuse the culture so deeply that they affect your 
mind even if you have no direct encounter with them. Moby-Dick is such 
a book. Its influence is everywhere, its power capacious, even mystical. 
Its deep themes are involved in your thinking about the world and can be 
redeployed to change your thinking about it, whether you have read the 
novel or not. My ambition here is to use Moby-Dick as a vehicle through 
which to interrogate core features of American corporate law and 
excavate some of the deeper lessons about the human soul that lurk behind 
the pasteboard mask of the law’s black letter. The inquiry yields an 
illuminating vantage on the ethical consequences of corporate capital 
structure, the law of corporate purpose, the meaning of voluntarism, the 
ethical stakes of corporate fiduciary obligations, and the role of lawyers 
in preventing or facilitating corporate catastrophe. Pursuing the corporate 
law dimensions of Moby-Dick will also yield valuable insights about the 
novel itself, how it works, and why it works so well.  
“You know Moby Dick before you know it,”2 and yet you may not 
know, as I did not the first time I read it, some key particulars which, in 
order to ripen what follows, I must spoil from the start. So let us begin 
this account of corporate catastrophe by making explicit what Herman 
Melville saves for last: everyone dies at the end of Moby-Dick. Or nearly 
everyone. The two survivors are the narrator Ishmael, who lived to tell us 
 
* Peter Canisius, S.J. Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law. Dyosifon@scu.edu. I am 
profoundly grateful to my colleagues at Santa Clara Law School for thoughtful comments on earlier drafts 
of this article, and to the law school itself for its commitment to supporting this kind of scholarship.   
 1. HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY-DICK 27 (GEORGE STADE ED., BARNES & NOBLE CLASSICS ED. 
2005) (1851). 
 2. JONATHAN LETHEM, MORE ALIVE AND LESS LONELY: ON BOOKS AND WRITERS 77 (2018).  
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the tale, and the White Whale, who heaps and tasks us still.  
RAISING THE WHALE IN CORPORATE WATERS 
Reference is made to Moby-Dick in 125 state and federal cases.3 It 
comes up in underlying facts: many bars, restaurants, and boats in this 
country are named “Moby Dick,” and these are the loci of fights, 
accidents, and other legal strife.4 Jurists also invoke the novel in their 
legal analysis. It is referenced to rue the burdensome length of a 
proceeding (the book is long).5 It is invoked to depict a party’s dogged 
pursuit of some outcome, especially vengeance (you know why).6 It is 
incanted to explain that a case is really about something weightier than a 
superficial reading of the pleadings would suggest (e.g., “Defendant 
attempts to cast this litigation as little more than a liquor license case. That 
characterization is about as accurate as would be one that described Moby 
 
 3. An impressive clip. Compare JOHN STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH (1939) (referenced 
35 times in state and federal cases) and MARK TWAIN, HUCKLEBERRY FINN (1885) (referenced 59 times). 
But see WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR (1606) (referenced 149 times).  
 4. See e.g., State v. McKissic, 415 N.W.2d 341, 342 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (fight); Folger v. 
State, 648 P.2d 111, 113 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (fight); Goldies, Inc. v. Alaska Hotel & Rest. Employees 
Health & Welfare Fund, 622 P.2d 979, 980 (Alaska 1981) (labor dispute); Stark v. Commonwealth, 828 
S.W.2d 603, 605 (Ky. 1991), overruled by Thomas v. Commonwealth, 931 S.W.2d 446 (Ky. 1996) 
(armed robbery at restaurant); Romero v. ITW Food Equip. Grp., LLC, 987 F. Supp. 2d 93, 98–99 (D.D.C. 
2013) (worker injury at restaurant); Aylsworth v. Comm'r, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 1111 (T.C. 1963) (tax 
dispute involving ownership of boat); Thomson v. United States, 266 F.2d 852, 853–54 (4th Cir. 1959) 
(boating accident). 
 5. Petersen v. Bank of Am. Corp., 232 Cal. App. 4th 238, 254, 181 Cal. Rptr. 3d 330, 342 (2014) 
(describing a 3,000-plus page complaint as “Moby Dick”); Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd 
Conservation Soc'y, No. C11-2043JLR, 2017 WL 1057644, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 17, 2017) 
(characterizing the length of a dispute involving the protest of contemporary whaling activity as being 
longer than Moby-Dick); People v. Lee, 242 Cal. App. 4th 161, 176, 195 Cal. Rptr. 3d 76, 88 (2015) 
(characterizing the brevity of a policy report by contradistinguishing it to Moby-Dick); Hershey Chocolate 
of Virginia, Inc. v. Cty. of Augusta, 101 Va. Cir. 512 (2018) (describing the court’s own opinion as being 
as “turgid, dense, and seemingly without end as Herman Melville’s Moby Dick”); Commonwealth v. 
Seiders, 45 Pa. D. & C.3d 499, 499–500 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1987) (characterizing lapse between defendant’s 
guilty-plea and sentencing as lasting longer than Ahab’s hunt for Moby Dick). 
 6. Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 631 Pa. 1, 59–60, 108 A.3d 739, 774–75 (2014) (criticizing 
defense counsel for being “as monomaniacal as Captain Ahab in Moby Dick in seeking to confuse and 
thereby subvert Pennsylvania state procedural default doctrines in capital cases”); Diamond v. Diamond, 
360 Pa. Super. 101, 104, 519 A.2d 1012, 1013 n.1 (1987) (in marital dissolution, characterizing husband’s 
relationship to corporate property as being “as inseparable as Ahab and the white whale”); In re Recall of 
Washam, 257 P.3d 513, 520 (2011) (comparing intensity and recklessness of litigant’s pursuit of legal 
claim as akin to that of Captain Ahab in Moby-Dick); Eden Isles Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Dep’t of Bus. & 
Prof’l Regulations, Div. of Fla. Land Sales, Condominiums & Mobile Homes, 1 So. 3d 291, 293 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (“With the obstinacy of Captain Ahab in search of Moby Dick, the Division filed 
numerous exceptions to the judge’s conclusions.”); In re Escobedo, 513 B.R. 605, 617 (Bankr. D.N.M. 
2014) (characterizing creditor’s misconduct toward debtor: “Like Captain Ahab, she could think of 
nothing but revenge”).  
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Dick as being a book about a white whale.”7). In many cases the book’s 
majestic prose is borrowed to finely express what the law is. Not 
previously knowing it, you and I will now never forget that the owner of 
real property along the shoreline loses title to land that is worn away by 
“the sledge-hammering seas . . . the inscrutable tides of God.”8 The book 
is even cited as authority in a few cases concerning the law of whaling.9 
Moby-Dick thus roams expansively over the law’s oceans. Yet never has 
it been raised in the sea where one might surely expect to find it: the law 
of fiduciary duty, the law of loyalty, the law of good faith and bad. Despite 
the fame and influence of the book, and the vibrancy of these themes at 
its core, it has not been used in caselaw to explicate agency or corporate 
law principles. Neither is there scholarship directly on point.10 Moby-Dick 
was overlooked by literary elites in Melville’s day.11 The juridical and 
academic establishment in corporate law continues to miss it. Our 
understanding of corporate law has suffered from this lapse, and our 
understanding of the novel has perhaps suffered from it too. Here I take 
up the chase.   
THE NATURE OF THE FIRM HUNTING WHALES 
   Part of what is so engrossing about Moby-Dick is how strange, even 
unthinkable, the nineteenth-century whaling industry seems to modern 
readers. The ludicrous truth is captivating: a primary source of fuel in the 
industrializing world of the nineteenth century was whales, captured and 
 
 7. Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 582 F. Supp. 1220, 1227 (D. Mass.), modified, 749 F.2d 945 
(1st Cir. 1984); see also Teamsters Local Union No. 776 v. Rite Aid Corp., 638 F. Supp. 408, 411 (M.D. 
Pa. 1985) (“To say that this case is about production quotas is akin to saying that “Moby Dick” is about a 
whale. It is true but inaccurate.”). 
 8. Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 177 S.E.2d 513, 517 (1970). 
 9. Stevens v. Seacoast Co., 414 F.2d 1032, 1036 (5th Cir. 1969) (cited for evidence of common 
wage structures in the whaling industry); Cape Shore Fish Co. v. United States, 330 F.2d 961, 969 (Ct. 
Cl. 1964) (same).  
 10. Passing references to the novel in corporate law scholarship include Kent Greenfield & John 
E. Nilsson, Gradgrind’s Education: Using Dickins and Aristotle to Understand (And Replace?) The 
Business Judgment Rule, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 799, 813 n. 59 (1997) (noting Moby-Dick’s reference to the 
“lay system” used in compensating sailors on whaling ships; see infra text accompanying note 19 
(discussing the lay system)) and Eileen A. Scallen, Promises Broken vs. Promises Betrayed: Metaphor, 
Analogy, and the New Fiduciary Principle, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 897, 924 n. 112 (1993) (discussing 
Melville’s use of the “monkey rope” in Moby-Dick as a metaphor for fiduciary relationships; see infra 
text accompanying notes 74-81 (discussing the monkey rope)). Of course, the law and literature movement 
generally has evinced vast theoretical and topical coverage. For scholarship adumbrating core 
achievements and controversies in law and literature, see JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS 
ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW (1985) and RICHARD POSNER, LAW & LITERATURE (3d ed. 
2009).  
 11. See generally Paul Lauter, Melville Climbs the Canon, 66 AM. LIT. 1 (1994) (surveying 
Melville’s literary reputation, with special reference to Moby-Dick).  
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killed for their oil.12 Whale oil fueled the growth of capitalist America by 
greasing its factory machines and, perhaps more importantly, illuminating 
its nights. Production and consumption, legal work, the whole stuff of 
truck, barter, and exchange, carried on through the nineteenth-century 
evening as relentlessly as it did the day, by light of whale oil. This 
changed only when it became more efficient to seek oil underground by 
building spouts above it, instead of seeking oil underwater by chasing 
spouts across it.13  
   Whaling was a capital intensive industry. Large ships were built and 
expensively provisioned, then crewed with around thirty men and boys 
who would undertake a voyage that would last years, extending to the 
farthest reaches of the world in pursuit of whales that would be hunted in 
smaller boats launched off the ship. Captured whales were stripped and 
boiled down in fireworks maintained on board the ship, and their oil was 
then stored in large casks until the ship returned to its home port. Whaling 
was risky business. Many men were killed by whales or in other accidents 
at sea. Ships would get wrecked in the typhoons that stalked the best 
whaling waters. Pirates would chase down successful whaling ships and 
steal their hard-gained oil. After a many-years venture, a ship might come 
back “clean,” with no oil in it, because no whales were found or none 
captured, or the bounty was stolen. But if a ship came back safe and 
sound, full of oil, there was tremendous profit in it.14  
Because of the industry’s capital demands and riskiness, whaling ships 
were not usually wholly-owned by a single entrepreneur. Rather, each 
ship would have numerous investors, and whaling investors diversified 
their interests across many ships. Melville emphasizes this organizational 
form early in his novel. When Ishmael is first interviewing for a position 
on the Pequod with the ship’s promoters, Captains Bildad and Peleg, he 
notes: 
 
 12. For some readers, revulsion at the atrocity of whale hunting from a humanitarian or ecological 
standpoint may trigger a rejection of any invitation to use Moby-Dick to grapple with other intellectual or 
moral themes. I urge such readers to continue precisely because of that revulsion. The agony of the whales, 
their near extinction, and the ecological devastation of whaling, are inexorably connected to the corporate 
law dynamics under review here. Understanding that corporate law connection is crucial to reversing that 
devastation, and saving the whales. See also infra note 26 (on the suffering of hunted whales).     
 13. See generally ERIC JAY DOLIN, LEVIATHAN: THE HISTORY OF WHALING IN AMERICA, (2007) 
(a comprehensive study of the rise and fall of the American whaling industry that provides extensive 
bibliographic material). Whale bone was also a valuable nineteenth-century commodity, used in corsets 
and other decorative items. Spermaceti, the pure and special oil taken from sperm whales like Moby Dick, 
was used in expensive candles, cosmetics, and medicines. Id. at 35-36.  
 14. In the mid-to-late nineteenth-century, a single captured whale might yield oil and bone worth 
$2,000-$3,000, at a time when the mean family income was $600-$800 per year in the United States.  See 
Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the Whaling Industry, 5 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 84 n. 3 (1989). See also DOLIN, supra note 13 at 270-72 (discussing profitability 
of whaling).   
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[Bildad and Peleg were among] the largest owners of the vessel; the other 
shares, as is sometimes the case in these ports, being held by a crowd of 
old annuitants; widows, fatherless children, and chancery wards; each 
owning about the value of a timber head, or a foot of plank, or a nail or two 
in the ship. People in Nantucket invest their money in whaling vessels, the 
same way that you do yours in approved state stocks bringing in good 
interest.15 
By highlighting that the Pequod is a corporate enterprise held by passive 
investors, Melville structures the story at its core in terms of fiduciary 
relationships. Captain Ahab’s pursuit of the White Whale is not the story 
of private hubris gone wrong. It is the story of corporate catastrophe.16  
Melville is given occasion to grapple deeply with conflicts of 
individuality and loyalty, autonomy and compulsion, excess and restraint, 
because to tell his story he must confront an emergent organizational form 
that evokes these tensions within the individual human heart and forces 
them to play out across our relationships. In this we witness the synergies 
of institutional, legal, literary, and ethical innovation. Moby-Dick is given 
life by a corporate conception, and then it returns the favor by breathing 
deeper meanings into the corporate form.17   
PURPOSE AND CONSCIENCE ON THE PEQUOD  
Among the most important issues in corporate law is what purpose 
corporate operations are supposed to pursue. On this question, scholars 
 
 15. MOBY-DICK, supra note 1, at 106. The reference here to “approved state stocks” alludes to the 
relatively weak system of state-based securities regulation that prevailed before the Securities Act of 1933 
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were adopted during the Great Depression.  
 16. Compare JACK LONDON, THE SEA WOLF (1904) (concerning Wolf Larsen, the monomaniacal 
captain of a seal-hunting schooner, who owns his ship out-right; London’s is a gripping, inspiring tale, 
but the narrow institutional context makes for a limited exploration of the forms of human life. Captain 
Larsen is an owner, Captain Ahab, more interestingly, is a manager).  
 17. Ishmael does not say one way or the other whether the Pequod was literally incorporated.  
Whaling firms in the 1830s and 1840s were in fact sometimes organized through formal corporate 
charters. However, most were unincorporated ventures.  The modern corporate form did not become 
widely available to business enterprise in the United States until the late-nineteenth-century. I am 
concerned with using Moby-Dick to aid our modern thinking about contemporary corporate law, so I do 
not struggle here for a neat pairing of my analysis with an historical assessment of the nineteenth-century 
whaling industry. Nevertheless, it is clear that mid-nineteenth-century American whaling did evince many 
core corporate characteristics, including fractional ownership by diversified shareholders, and the 
separation of ownership and control.  While whaling investors did not get limited liability by dint of their 
legal form (even nineteenth-century corporations did not always grant shareholders limited liability), 
whaling investors were mostly only on the hook (the harpoon) for what they invested, because the ventures 
were funded largely with equity, were insured, and because tort liability for maritime activity in that era 
was scant. For an excellent and technically precise overview of the law and economics of nineteenth-
century whaling see generally Eric Hilt, Investment and Diversification in the American Whaling 
Industry, 67 J. OF ECON. HIST. 292 (2007) and Eric Hilt, Incentives in Corporations: Evidence from the 
American Whaling Industry, 49 J. L. & ECON. 197 (2006). I am grateful to Professor Hilt for his generosity 
in corresponding with me on these issues. 
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are divided both as to what the law is and what it should be.  Some 
academics argue that corporate law requires directors to manage 
corporations solely in the interests of shareholders and forbids the 
sacrifice of corporate profits in order to serve other ends. Other scholars 
insist that corporate directors are not required to serve only shareholders 
but can instead legitimately attend to other stakeholders or issues, such as 
workers, consumers, or the environment, even at the expense of 
shareholder profits. My view is that existing corporate law in the United 
States requires shareholder primacy, but I think this rule should be 
changed. Moby-Dick gets the law of corporate governance right and sees 
clearly the stakes of this crucial debate.18   
When it came time for Ishmael to “negotiate” (take or leave) 
compensation for sailing on the Pequod, Captain Peleg, a manager of the 
venture, wants to put him down for the “300th lay.” This is whaling cant 
for 1/300 of the ship’s total profits.19 But Peleg’s co-manager, Captain 
Bildad, thinks this is too much to offer the inexperienced Ishmael and 
wants to give him the “777th lay” (1/777 of the ship’s profits). Peleg and 
Bildad debate the legitimacy of shareholder primacy in the ship’s 
governance:  
“Why, blast your eyes, Bildad,” cried Peleg, “thou dost not want to swindle 
this young man! he must have more than that . . . . 
 Bildad laid down his book, and turning solemnly towards him said, 
“Captain Peleg, thou hast a generous heart; but thou must consider the duty 
thou owest to the other owners of this ship—widows and orphans, many of 
them—and that if we too abundantly reward the labors of this young man, 
we may be taking the bread from those widows and those orphans. The 
seven hundred and seventy-seventh lay, Captain Peleg.” 
 . . . [Peleg replies:] “Blast ye, Captain Bildad, if I had followed thy 
advice in these matters, I would afore now had a conscience to lug about 
that would be heavy enough to founder the largest ship that ever sailed 
round Cape Horn.”20 
Who should have a heavier conscience: Captain Bildad, the 
shareholder primacist, or Captain Peleg, who wants the Pequod’s board 
to govern in a more “socially responsible” manner?  Bildad is a man who 
contains multitudes: he is at once a pious Christian (he is reading from the 
Bible even as Peleg approaches him about Ishmael’s wages) and he is a 
strict adherent to the idea that the Pequod must be run only to maximize 
 
 18. For a full review of this dispute, see DAVID YOSIFON, CORPORATE FRICTION: HOW 
CORPORATE LAW IMPEDES AMERICAN PROGRESS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT, 60-96 (2018). 
 19. MOBY-DICK, supra note 1 at 110; see also Lance E. Davis et al., Risk Sharing, Crew Quality, 
Labor Shares and Wages in the Nineteenth Century American Whaling Industry, NATIONAL BUREAU OF 
ECONOMIC RESEARCH, NBER Working Paper Series on Historical Factors in Long-Run Growth, No. 13 
(1990) (economic analysis of the lay system). 
 20. MOBY-DICK, supra note 1 at 110. 
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shareholder profits. This seeming hypocrisy makes Ishmael wonder how 
Bildad sleeps at night. He assumes he does it the old-fashioned way: “very 
probably he had long since come to the sage and sensible conclusion that 
a man’s religion is one thing, and this practical world quite another.”21  
Walt Whitman shrugged and had a cozy nap: “Do I contradict myself / 
Very well then I contradict myself.”22 But the truth of Bildad’s easy 
slumber is simpler and perhaps more pernicious than this. For the pious 
Bildad, and shareholder primacy theory, there is no contradiction. They 
are sure that shareholder primacy is the most socially responsible 
corporate governance system. On their view, the board must govern the 
corporation strictly on behalf of shareholders in order to give people the 
incentive to passively invest capital in socially useful enterprises. This 
gets whale oil to consumers, creates jobs for people like Ishmael, and 
makes a tax base for the polity. Unlike capital investors, workers and 
consumers do not need directors’ active protection in the boardroom 
before they will participate in corporate undertakings. Labor can attend to 
its own interests at the point of production by negotiating terms of 
employment and threatening to quit if they are mistreated. Consumers 
control their corporate interests at the cash register (or the checkout 
screen), deciding on what terms they are willing to deal with a firm, if at 
all. As “residual claimants,” shareholders only benefit from corporate 
operations after all other stakeholders have received the benefit of their 
bargains. Dividends are only paid, if they are paid, once wages, products, 
and taxes have been delivered. Shareholders are therefore first in the 
corporate conscience only because they are last at the corporate trough. 
In this way, shareholder primacy serves society’s most vulnerable 
members, lifting them out of poverty and bringing them delights in ways 
that superficially more socially-conscious systems would not.23 Captain 
Bildad suffers neither cognitive nor spiritual dissonance in 
simultaneously running a dangerous profit-maximizing extraction 
industry, paying long-lays to his sailors, and maintaining his sincerely 
held Christian religious convictions. He sleeps very well indeed.24  
Captain Peleg’s conscience is rattled at the prospect of paying an 
unfavorable lay to Ishmael. But sometimes it is a mistake to calibrate 
conscience by the untutored impulses of the heart. Like our eating system, 
 
 21. Id. at 107.  
 22. WALT WHITMAN, Song of Myself, in LEAVES OF GRASS (1892). 
 23. For a fuller discussion of these claims and their academic advocates, see YOSIFON, 
CORPORATE FRICTION, supra note 18, at 7-17. 
 24. My concern is really to describe the purported coherence between shareholder primacy and a 
concern for social interests generally. The religious dimension is just one manifestation of that social 
concern. For sustained argument on behalf of the harmony of Christianity and shareholder primacy, see 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Christianity and Corporate Purpose (Dec. 1, 2019). UCLA School of Law, Law-
Econ Research Paper No. 19-10, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3496850.   
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which signals “hunger” whenever it is in the presence of sugar or fat, such 
impulses might have been a useful ethical guide to doing business in 
earlier epochs of human development. But some instincts must be 
restrained if we are to flourish under modern institutional arrangements, 
where, for example, junk food is always available, or where complex, 
capital-intensive production must be effectively orchestrated.25 In the end 
conscience should be dictated by theory, not the other way around.  
Then again, maybe it is Captain Bildad’s satisfied mind that needs the 
disruptive provocation of theoretical inquiry. Charged with managing 
firms only to pursue profits for shareholders, faithful directors will work 
tirelessly to externalize costs, wherever possible, to workers, consumers, 
the environment, or whales.26 The command to maximize shareholder 
wealth encourages directors to skimp not only on wages but also on 
worker and consumer safety. The claim that non-shareholders can manage 
their own interests in corporate operations ignores the practical reality that 
many stakeholders have a limited ability to do so, especially given the 
firm’s motivation to obfuscate on important issues. Proponents of 
shareholder primacy acknowledge this incentive for directors to exploit 
others on behalf of shareholders. They insist, however, that this problem 
should be solved outside of corporate governance, through labor law, 
 
 25. See generally Adam Benforado, Jon Hanson, and David Yosifon, Broken Scales: Obesity and 
Justice in America, 53 EMORY L. J. 1645, 1675-1689 (2004) (describing evolution of the human eating 
system and its maladaptation to the contemporary food environment).  
 26. In surveying the corporate catastrophe of Moby-Dick we must highlight the calamity of the 
whales. On Nantucket Island, whaling began as a sustainable subsistence activity by the Wampanoag, a 
Native American tribe, who harvested blubber and bones from whales that washed up on the beach. By 
the time the Pequod sets sail in the mid-nineteenth-century, Nantucket whaling firms had to travel 
thousands of miles from home to hunt because by then industrial whaling had already wiped-out the whale 
populations off the Massachusetts coast. Whales brought nearly to extinction by overfishing is a statistic, 
but the suffering of any given whale in the course of the hunt is a tragedy. Ishmael tells that in his era 
whales were killed by slicing into their lungs with lances again and again, causing the massive creatures 
to thrash about in agony, drowning in their own gore until dead. The novel itself is both inspired by the 
glories of whale hunting and ashamed of its depravity. 
  Advances in petroleum production effectively ended the whale oil industry by the 1890s. But 
advances in whaling technology, and continued global demand for whale products such as baleen, actually 
resulted in dramatically increased kills of whales in the early decades of the 20th-century as compared to 
the “golden age” of whaling depicted in Moby-Dick. By the middle of the 20th-century, with many species 
of whales nearing extinction from human predation, serious regulatory restriction of whaling finally broke 
through. The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) was established in 1946, 
and the United States adopted federal statutes in the 1960s and 1970s prohibiting whaling altogether.  An 
international ban on whaling was promulgated through the International Whaling Commission in 1986, 
with exceptions granted for hallowed cultural and religious practices. Today it is not so much hunting as 
climate change that threatens the whales. The same thirst for oil that once chased the whales with harpoons 
now stalks them with rising temperatures in the sea.  Climate change is a civilizational threat, and the 
corporate law dynamics that wrecked the Pequod are at the heart of the human causes of that catastrophe 
too. See generally Alison Rieser, Whales, Whaling, and the Warming Oceans, 36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 401, 401 (2009) (summarizing regulatory environment on whaling, and examining the threat to 
whales from climate change); see also Henri Féron, A New Ocean: The Legal Challenges of the Artic 
Thaw, 45 ECOLOGY L.Q. 83 (2018) (describing climate change risk to whales and other sea mammals). 
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environmental law, or consumer protection statutes. Shareholder 
primacy’s critics view this as inadequate, because they anticipate what 
has in fact been seen from the nineteenth-century whaling industry 
through the twenty-first century technology industry: directors pursue 
shareholder profits just as doggedly through governments as they do 
through production and distribution processes, for example, by working 
to stunt the development of costly regulation. Critics also emphasize the 
ways in which shareholder primacy can be culturally destructive. Patriotic 
conscience, for example, is afforded no place in the shareholder primacy 
boardroom—not when it conflicts with the bottom-line. Firms 
unhesitatingly export jobs to cheaper labor markets abroad, irrespective 
of the consequences to domestic workers and national cohesion.27  
From this critical viewpoint, shareholder primacy’s merely ostensible 
coherence has lulled Captain Bildad into an intellectual and moral 
complacency. As Captain Peleg and Ishmael approached Bildad for the 
lay negotiation, he was reading aloud a passage from his Bible: “Lay not 
up for yourselves treasures upon earth, where moth and rust doth corrupt, 
and where thieves break through and steal / But lay up for yourselves 
treasures in heaven, where neither moth nor rust doth corrupt.”28 Melville 
turns this passage into slapstick by italicizing “lay,” thus putting on the 
nose the connection between the issue of what “lay” Ishmael will receive 
and the biblical injunction against earthly concerns. Slapstick too can be 
instructive. Bildad is consciously, or worse still, unconsciously, using the 
Bible, a text avowedly sacred to him, to manipulate Ishmael. In the end 
he may end up fooling (and making a fool of) himself too. Our deep-
seeded impulse to avoid cognitive dissonance, our driving psychological 
motive to find alignment between our opinions and our behaviors, makes 
us a threat not just to others but to ourselves.29 The seeming coherence of 
shareholder primacy has given Bildad a mirage of coherence in his own 
life. With his Bible in one hand, corporate ledger in the other, peace in his 
heart, and harmony in his head, dissonance avoidance has made a cartoon 
of Bildad. If we could let the contradictions dwell in our conscience, we 
might know ourselves better and turn our slapstick lives to more serious 
productions. Instead, we collapse everything into coherence and live in a 
happy fog.  
But let us neither condescend to the absurd nor be overly righteous in 
 
 27. The literature critiquing shareholder primacy is expansive. For a review and assessment, see 
YOSIFON, CORPORATE FRICTION, supra note 18 at 17-60. On replacing shareholder primacy with a 
stakeholder-oriented corporate governance system, see id. at 172-206. 
 28. MOBY-DICK, supra note 1 at 110 (the passage from which Bildad is reading is MATTHEW 6:19-
20). 
 29. See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective 
on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L. J. 1, 107-115 (2004) (reviewing social psychological findings on 
dissonance avoidance in human cognition). 
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our thinking about who is confused here. The scene works for laughs and 
as literature, and as an adjunct to corporate theory, because it is finally 
not polemical. Good writing can make a reader more confident, but great 
writing will leave them lost. Melville paints both sides of the corporate 
purpose debate, and while anyone can find confirmation of their priors in 
the text (as my preceding paragraphs well show), the honest reader is also 
confronted with complexity that must in the end leave them uncertain. 
Novelists do not have the policymaker’s responsibility to finally make 
legal decisions and settle designs with particularity, as must be done. But 
knowing the complexities in a beautiful way can make us humble about 
our policy choices and unsanctimonious towards our opponents. Just 
when you are sure that shareholder primacy has made a mess of everyone 
involved, this comes: Ishmael brings along his new best friend Queequeg, 
a Pacific-Islander tattooed from head to foot, to sign up with the Pequod 
too. Queequeg gives the managers a brief demonstration of his 
harpooning skill by striking a bulls-eye through a small tar-stain floating 
in the water off the side of the ship. Captain Bildad quickly offers him the 
“90th lay”, a far better rate than was given to Ishmael. The profit-motive 
is narrow, so narrow that it can sometimes sneak a path right through the 
worst demons of human nature. Queequeg is judged not by the inked icons 
on his skin, nor by racist presumptions about his character, but by the 
content of his harpooning skill. This anti-racist policy is dictated not from 
Bildad’s Bible, nor any conscious humanitarianism, but from the acid 
bath of the market.30  
After settling terms with Ishmael and Queequeg, the pious Bildad does 
take a quick stab at converting the pagan Queequeg, but Peleg steps in—
now he is the one thinking of the widows and orphans (or his own 
investment). He says it is better to have some “shark” in a harpooner on a 
whale hunt, and not too much of a Christian outlook.31 The profit-
maximand thus also saves Queequeg from Bildad’s proselytizing. 
(Although then again, the rule of profit-maximization may function here 
as a censor of Good News). As for bad news, there will be plenty to come 
for the Pequod Incorporated.  
SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY AND THE SINKING OF THE PEQUOD  
Everyone involved in a corporate enterprise—shareholders, creditors, 
workers, consumers, the government—wants the corporation to succeed. 
 
 30. See generally RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992) (arguing that competitive markets reduce racial discrimination more 
effectively than does government regulation); GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 
(1971) (arguing that the profit motive ameliorates racial discrimination in competitive markets).   
 31. MOBY-DICK, supra note 1 at 122. 
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Yet the interests of these groups are not aligned, and often are in tension. 
One important divergence relates to stakeholder attitudes towards risk.  
Because the stockholders of the Pequod hold investments spread-out 
across numerous ships, they prefer each individual ship to be managed in 
a relatively aggressive fashion. Diversified investors do not care so much 
if any one ship in their portfolio comes back “clean” (i.e., empty) or does 
not come back at all. The real money may be in the high upside of very 
successful voyages.32 This institutional design is an integral component 
of the catastrophe of Moby-Dick. The managers of the Pequod knew 
Captain Ahab well. They knew that on a prior voyage he had lost his leg 
to an enraged whale (lost it, we will learn, to Moby Dick). Ahab suffered 
terribly after that attack. He was fevered and delirious the whole long 
journey home to Nantucket. Back on shore he recovered but was changed. 
Never previously gregarious, Ahab now became deeply, strangely 
reserved. The Pequod’s managers could not fathom exactly what was 
going on with “Old Thunder” (as he was known) but they knew he was 
off.33 So strange did Ahab seem that in their superstitious ways the 
Nantucketers thought he might be “invested . . . with terrors, not entirely 
underived from the land of spirits and of wails.”34 Yet they let it ride. 
Looking to the high upside that an especially exercised whaling captain 
might deliver, they put Ahab in charge again of the next voyage of the 
Pequod. Understand that Ahab was put in command of the Pequod not 
despite its directors knowing he was twisted but because of it:  
[F]ar from distrusting his fitness for another whaling voyage, on account 
of such dark symptoms, the calculating people of that prudent isle were 
inclined to harbor the conceit, that for those very reasons he was all the 
better qualified and set on edge, for a pursuit so full of rage and wildness 
as the bloody hunt of whales.35  
The shareholder primacy corporation will commodify danger, it will 
commodify dementedness, it will for the stockholders seek to commodify 
even suspicion of supernatural possession. A charismatic person at the 
 
 32. See John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 35, 36 (2014) (“Diversified shareholders . . . want the firm to take more risks than would a sole 
owner. Managers are undiversified, because they have human capital tied up with their firm. Corporate 
governance mechanisms consequently encourage managers to take risks as if they were diversified”). 
Judge Winter’s opinion in Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982) remains a touchstone here: “Some 
opportunities offer great profits at the risk of very substantial losses, while the alternatives offer less risk 
of loss but also less potential profit. Shareholders can reduce the volatility of risk by diversifying their 
holdings. In the case of the diversified shareholder, the seemingly more risky alternatives may well be the 
best choice since great losses in some stocks will over time be offset by even greater gains in others.”  Id. 
at 886. 
 33. MOBY-DICK, supra note 1, at 112-13. 
 34. Id. at 536-37. Note Melville’s double-entendre, invoking the supernatural with reference to 
“wails.”  
 35. Id. at 537. 
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helm of a whaling ship is more likely to return a ship full of sperm than 
is a cautious one, and investors only need some full ships to off-set a 
number of misspent adventures. I am not reading corporate law into this. 
Rather it is incumbent upon us to make this lesson part of our corporate 
law understanding. What happened on the Pequod, we must predict, is at 
work in its ways in our modern oil companies, our pharmaceutical 
concerns, our social media giants, and in our venture capital funds.  
The risk-preferring posture of shareholders clashes with labor’s 
preference that individual firms be managed carefully, with a risk-averse 
attitude. Whereas equity investors are diversified, workers have a lumpy 
stake in their particular job with a specific firm and, compared to 
shareholders, care more about abject corporate failure and less about high 
corporate profitability. On the Pequod, as in many workplaces, it is not 
just jobs that are at stake, but also life, limb, and wellness. Notice that this 
misalignment of interests bedevils the workers even where the captain is 
behaving properly. The shareholders are hoping that Ahab’s affliction 
manifests in risky whale-hunting. They lose if it instead manifests 
disloyally in the idiosyncratic pursuit of one weird, dangerous whale. But 
the ordinary sailors lose either way.36  
Worse than putting Ahab at the helm, the Pequod’s directors kept 
Ahab’s off-kilter condition a secret. “[T]hrough their zeal for him, they 
had all conspired, so far as in them lay, to muffle up the knowledge of this 
thing from others; and hence it was, that not till a considerable interval 
had elapsed, did it transpire upon the Pequod’s decks.”37 The directors 
knew, but they did not tell the crew. In fact, the prudent Ishmael had asked 
to see Ahab before signing up, thinking it wise to meet a ship’s chief 
executive officer before joining up for such a long and perilous gig. Here 
Ishmael was doing what apologists for shareholder primacy expect: 
workers attend to their own interests at the point of production, freeing 
directors to serve the interests of absent, passive shareholders. But as 
critics of shareholder primacy anticipate, the corporate managers of the 
 
 36. The “lay” system described above, supra text accompanying note 19, deployed one classic 
method of better aligning the interests of principals and agents: incentive-based compensation. Ishmael 
says that because of the lay system formality and corporal discipline were less severe on whaling ships 
than on merchant or naval vessels. But incentive-based compensation cannot eliminate the agency 
problem. Since the sailors’ stake in the Pequod’s venture is not diversified, they are still more risk-averse 
than common shareholders. The lay gives an incentive to hunt, but most sailors have a “long lay,” and 
bounded willpower, and so may still prefer to feed on the ship’s daily dole rather than going after whales, 
or big whales anyway. Or, another misalignment, the men might be rougher with the ship and other capital 
equipment, because they are focused on short-term gains to be had on the present voyage, as against the 
longer-term interests of the ship’s investors. The workers look to consume capital, just as capital looks to 
consume the workers. In this mournful way does the organizational form of the Pequod reflect rather than 
transcend the state of nature it confronts: “Oh, horrible vultureism of earth! from which not the mightiest 
whale [nor any corporate stakeholder] is free.” Id. at 365.  
 37. Id. at 536. 
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Pequod mislead our reasonably prudent narrator about the risks of this 
venture. Director Peleg does it with ambiguity, that most potent weapon 
of the manipulator. Ishmael asks to meet Ahab, but Peleg puts him off:  
I don’t think thou wilt be able to at present. I don’t know exactly what’s 
the matter with him; but he keeps close inside the house; a sort of sick, and 
yet he don’t look so. In fact, he ain’t sick; but no, he isn’t well either. Any 
how, young man, he won’t always see me, so I don’t suppose he will thee.38  
This is not the kind of disclosure one would require of a fiduciary, but it 
is fine for the morals of the marketplace. More than fine, it is a morality 
which Bildad is obligated, in fealty to the shareholders, to don in dealing 
with a common sailor.39 As for Ishmael, the doe-eyed alchemist of 
optimism in him turns this ambiguity about Ahab into confirmation, 
finding in its assay evidence that everything will probably work out 
alright.40 He joins up.  
Capital’s risk-preferring approach to corporate governance does not 
work out in every instance. For any given firm it may backfire. Ahab’s 
charisma, it turns out, will not be deployed to fill the hull with sperm, for 
“with the mad secret of his unabated rage bolted up and keyed in him, 
Ahab had purposely sailed upon the present voyage with the one only and 
all-engrossing object of hunting the White Whale.”41 And Ahab’s 
vengeance will not in the end be visited upon that whale, but upon the 
firm, for Moby Dick escapes after smashing and sinking the ship. Yet the 
drowning of the Pequod and nearly all of its men leaves no lasting stain 
upon this capitalist design. In hiring a maddened captain to head up 
already dangerous work the Pequod’s directors played with fire, but they 
did not really get burned. They and the other investors enjoy the retardant 
of diversification and insurance. Indeed, if ships never sink that may be 
evidence that their crews are too risk-averse, from a profit-maximization 
perspective. Moby-Dick chronicles a catastrophe for the sailors and their 
 
 38. Id.  at 112-113. 
 39. We implies they, and loyalty implies abandonment. In their loyalty to the shareholders, the 
ship’s promoters are disloyal to their friend Ahab. For expected gains, they put Ahab in charge of the ship, 
disregarding the danger this makes of Ahab to himself. See infra text accompanying notes 42-55 
(exploring the relationship between Ahab’s corporate association and his self-destruction). Ahab’s 
disloyalty to the shareholders is bred in the promotor’s disloyalty to him, which is motivated by their 
loyalty to the shareholders. “Ah monstrous / sweet monsters, / who spawned / thee chalk?” JACK 
KEROUAC, BOOK OF BLUES 129 (1995). 
 40. See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 29, at 96-100 (reviewing studies on optimism bias). The 
grease of ambiguity is also enough to keep the pious Captain Bildad feeling smoothly about putting his 
friend Ahab at the helm. As the Pequod is piloted out of Nantucket harbor, with Ahab still cloistered 
unseen in his cabin below deck, Bildad looks around at the scene and murmurs, unconvincingly to any 
but a bad-faith dissonance avoider, “a pleasant sun is all he needs.” MOBY-DICK, supra note 1, at 183. 
Again we see the corrupting combination of the law’s command to shareholder wealth maximization, on 
the one hand, and the mind’s command to dissonance avoidance, on the other. 
 41. MOBY-DICK, supra note 1, at 228 (emphasis added). 
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families, but to the stockholders it just ledgers the cost of doing business.  
THE CORPORATE TRAGEDY OF CAPTAIN AHAB 
Having witnessed that the sinking of the Pequod was a corporate affair, 
come now to the little lower layer and see the corporate causes of the 
wrecking of that legendary man who lost that miserable ship, Captain 
Ahab. The separation of ownership and control in whaling vessels was 
measured by thousands of miles, with no chance for ongoing oversight by 
the owners on land over the managers at sea. It was therefore especially 
important to have a skillful, loyal chief executive officer in command of 
a whaling vessel.42 As we have seen, Ahab instead exploits his position 
to advance his own private interest, vengeance, rather than pursuing the 
corporate purpose of the Pequod.43  
What I want to emphasize here is that it is the corporate form that 
enables the disloyal Ahab to do so much damage not just to the ship and 
the men he commands but also to himself. Ahab does not own the Pequod.  
Maybe if he did, he would have stayed more focused on the hunt or been 
more cautious about the dangers of pursuing that White Whale. Our own 
well-being, the good maintenance of our own soul and heart, can be hard 
to track and manage. But hearing the creaking of one’s own—one’s 
owned—timbers, or seeing the tearing of one’s owned sails, can give 
some focus to ideas about what is really in one’s own best interest and 
can keep the steering on a prudent course. The rattling of the Pequod in 
the chase of Moby Dick does not wake Ahab from his private nightmare, 
for it is not his vessel that strains. Ahab is alienated from the ship’s time, 
supplies, and timbers, and through this alienation is freed into his 
unmoored, destructive fancies. Being the manager of other people’s 
money, rather than his own, creates an agency problem not just for the 
ship’s owners but for Ahab himself.44   
Anyone can fantasize about big deviance, but with the power of the 
corporation those fantasies can be made into self-destructive reality. No 
one person could, or rationally would, own outright a ship as big and 
capable as the Pequod. Ahab in a dinghy on a private fishing trip is a 
 
 42. See Davis et. al., supra note 19 at 19 (“The choice of the captain . . . was immensely important 
to the success of a voyage.”). 
 43. Corporate officers owe the same duties of loyalty and care to the corporation and its 
shareholders as are owed by corporate directors. See Aaron D. Jones, Corporate Officer Wrongdoing and 
the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Officers Under Delaware Law, 44 AM. BUS. L. J. 475 (2007). 
 44. Here I showcase the ways in which corporate law facilitates Ahab’s ruin.  For a very different, 
but certainly related, analysis, see C.L.R James’s brilliant treatment of Ahab as representing a proto-
totalitarian revolt against democracy and capitalism, in MARINERS, RENEGADES, AND CASTAWAYS 60 
(1953) (written while James was imprisoned on Ellis Island awaiting deportation; “Melville’s theme is 
totalitarianism, its rise and fall, its power and its weakness.”).  
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threat to no one, neither to investors, nor sailors, nor to himself. Ahab at 
home in his easy chair, stewing over that lost leg and that damn whale, 
might eventually get over it. He might finally see that nothing could be 
done about it, and he might instead end up playing with his toddler son or 
making with his wife a few more dents in their marital pillow.45 Left to 
his own devices, Ahab could not bring thirty men, the ship, and himself 
to their immediate ruin pursuing his mad, selfish ambition. It is the 
corporate form, with its means of aggregating capital, with its methods of 
separating ownership and control, that enables Ahab’s enormous, 
anomalous undertaking.   
Beyond the ship itself, Ahab makes use of corporate knowledge, and 
the cultural capital of the corporation, to accomplish his suicidal mission.  
He has at his disposal the ship’s books and records from many previous 
journeys. These track the path of sperm whales with a granularity 
approaching the social media algorithms that track your movements and 
mind today. Ahab could not have found Moby Dick without these 
corporate assets. That data does not exist without the rationalizing, profit-
maximizing imperatives driving whaling ventures. Without this corporate 
knowledge to misappropriate, Ahab would be left to search for the White 
Whale only in his corrupted mind. Imagination can be dangerous but not 
so dangerous as imagination mixed with corporate intelligence. 
Ahab also takes advantage of the rules of corporate governance to bring 
disadvantage to himself. The law prescribes profit-maximization but 
under the “business judgment rule” it defers entirely to managerial 
discretion regarding the means of pursuing that end.46 Among the 
discretionary customs of whale hunting that Ishmael is giddy to praise is 
the “gam.” When two whaling vessels pass each other on the open-sea, 
they often stop and “have a gam:” the sailors come aboard each other’s 
ships to socialize, often with drink.47 Ishmael says that in gams, officers 
 
 45. In one mournful reflection Ahab rues that he had sailed on a whaling job the day after marrying, 
leaving “but one dent in my marriage pillow,” Moby-Dick, supra note 1 at 621, and making his wife a 
constructive-widow before he made her an actual one. Cf. SENA JETER NASLUND, AHAB’S WIFE: OR, THE 
STAR GAZER: A NOVEL (2005) (well-reviewed novel imagining the life of Ahab’s wife).  
 46. Under the business judgment rule, corporate decisions that are legal, unconflicted, and 
informed, will not be second-guessed by judges. Weird, bad, or even disastrous business decisions will 
not give rise to liability for directors’ breach of their duty of care, so long as they were undertaken in good 
faith. See e.g., In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 139 (Del. Ch. 2009) 
(dismissing shareholder suit against directors who lost hundreds of millions of dollars in the subprime 
mortgage market, on business judgment rule grounds). Certainly Ahab’s decision to hunt Moby Dick does 
not enjoy business judgment rule protection, because it is self-interested.  My point here is that the latitude 
of the business judgment rule, profitable as it is in general, can also create cover beneath which the 
unscrupulous agent can effectively destroy not just corporate value, but their own character too.  
 47. These gams might last for days (giving perhaps some historical context to cushy contemporary 
corporate “retreats”). Letters were exchanged in the gams, as whaling ships (get this) often carried mail 
from shore just in case their intended recipient was stumbled upon thousands of miles away at sea. One 
of the benefits of this unlikely method is that it involved no reply-all option. See DOLIN, supra note 13 at 
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would commonly share information about where they had seen whales 
and where the hunting was good. In a shallow way, this seems contrary to 
the charge of profit maximization. The fewer whales killed by a 
competitor, the more valuable the oil brought to shore for one’s own firm. 
But the business judgment rule runs deep as the sea. Convivial customs 
on the cruising grounds may relax and fortify the men against the 
lonesome burdens of the long journey and the rigors of the hunt.48   
At one intriguing moment it seems that the possibility of a gam might 
even move Ahab out of his miserable solipsism, which might dislodge his 
selfish mission to hunt Moby Dick. Brooding again alone, he suddenly 
hears a man aloft cry, “sail ho!”49 The Pequod has come upon another 
whaleship. “‘Well, now, that’s cheering,’ cried Ahab, suddenly erecting 
himself, while whole thunder-clouds swept aside from his brow. ‘That 
lively cry upon this deadly calm might almost convert a better man.—
Where away?’”50 But alas, it is not for Ahab. He forbids the Pequod from 
ordinary gams, not because they are frivolous but because they are 
substantive: they threaten to enliven him back to the true purpose of the 
ship. Yet while refusing regular gams, he exploits this discretionary 
whaling custom in order to procure information for his sordid diversion. 
He calls out to passing ships for news of the White Whale. If he hears 
none, he sails on, deeper into his loneliness. But when the Pequod comes 
upon the Samuel Enderby, whose captain has a whale-bone prosthesis for 
an arm, matching the one on Ahab’s leg, both limbs lost to Moby Dick, 
Ahab calls for a gam and scampers aboard the neighboring ship. He is 
looking not for profitable leisure but information on the White Whale’s 
whereabouts, which he gets. The Samuel Enderby’s intelligence is 
available to the Pequod’s captain because of corporate law, not despite it.  
Thus we see in Moby-Dick that the latitude of the business judgment rule 
can become the crux upon which corporate malfeasance is leveraged. We 
see too that it can serve as the feckless agent’s gateway to a deeper 
depravity.    
Any single lost soul can tilt at windmills, but if you want to tangle with 
Leviathan, you are going to need a crew. To stand up against an awful 
whale you are going to need men who are committed to following the 
dictates of your command. Ronald Coase explained in The Nature of the 
Firm that among the most powerful features of corporate organization is 
the authority it bestows on managers to dictate to workers just what they 
 
276. 
 48. See Hutton v West Cork Railway Co. 23 Ch. D. 654 (1883) (“The law does not say that there 
are to be no cakes and ale, but there are to be no cakes and ale except such as are required for the benefit 
of the company.”). 
 49. MOBY-DICK, supra note 1, at 367. 
 50. Id.  
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will do and how they will do it. A worker’s engagement with the firm is 
contracted at a price, but within the day-to-day affairs of the business, 
“[i]f a workman moves from department Y to department X, he does not 
go because of a change in relative prices, but because he is ordered to do 
so.”51 Ahab, limping alone into a Nantucket bar, looking to rally a crew 
to hunt the whale that wounded him, would be laughed at. The Saturday 
night crowd would have seen him for a madman, bought him a drink and 
had some song, and they and Old Thunder too would have gone home to 
kiss their sleeping children. Ahab uses the fiction of the corporation to get 
good men to go along with his terrible plot. With the customs attendant 
to his agency, Ahab “masked himself; incidentally making use of them 
for other and more private ends than they were legitimately intended to 
subserve.”52  Melville understands how crucial the cultural capital of the 
workplace is to exercising the corporate power that Coase identified. “For 
be a man’s intellectual superiority what it will, it can never assume the 
practical, available supremacy over other men, without the aid of some 
sort of external arts and entrenchments, always in themselves, more or 
less paltry and base.”53 Without the forms and usages of the sea, Ahab 
could not have gotten the men to do his bidding.54 Being not Ahab but 
Captain Ahab, and salting his inducement with the promise of a gold 
doubloon “bonus” for the man who spots the White Whale, and plying the 
men with a little alcohol, Ahab easily wins the ship’s subagents over to 
his self-destructive plot.55 With the Pequod’s crew at his disposal, Ahab 
can fully torment himself, until he is finally not just lonesome but lost. 
THE SELF-PRESERVING MISSION OF LOYALTY 
The corporation, and corporate law, thus enables Ahab’s wrecking of 
his soul, before he wrecks the Pequod. However, the same corporate lens 
that we use to diagnose this catastrophe also suggests a pathway to 
redemption that might have saved Ahab, and might yet protect us readers 
from the Ahab in ourselves. As we witness the threat that Ahab’s agency 
poses to himself, we can also see the rescue that the dictates of agency 
law offered to him. We can see through Ahab’s tragedy that the function 
of the duty of loyalty is not only to protect the corporation from the agent, 
 
 51. Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 387 (1937). 
 52. MOBY-DICK, supra note 1, at 184. 
 53. Id. at 184. 
 54. One could read the men’s joining in Ahab’s vengeant quest as a kind of labor radicalism, a 
revolt against shareholder primacy, and against money-making in general. The men are hungry for 
something less filthy than lucre to which to attach their loyalty impulse, and they find it in Ahab’s pursuit 
of the White Whale. James, supra note 44, interprets the sailors’ acquiescence to Ahab’s frightful project 
as a prescient allegory of labor’s cooperation with fascist and communist dictatorship.   
 55. MOBY-DICK, supra note 1, at 184. 
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but to protect the agent from themself, and to keep the agent from being 
corrupted by the powers of the agency. The duty of loyalty requires 
thought of the self to be renounced, and this can be a blessed abnegation.  
At one point the oil casks in the Pequod’s hull were leaking, so the 
scrupulous First Mate, Starbuck, reports it to Ahab.56 The only thing to 
do, Starbuck advises, is to stop the ship, raise the Burtons (a pully used to 
lift the heavy casks), and set into repairs. Ahab at first insists they stay on 
course after Moby Dick: “Let it leak! . . . I’ll not have the Burtons 
hoisted.”57 Starbuck flashes the black letter: “What will the owners say, 
sir?”58 Ahab: 
Let the owners stand on Nantucket beach and outyell the Typhoons. What 
cares Ahab? Owners, owners? Thou art always prating to me, Starbuck, 
about those miserly owners, as if the owners were my conscience. But look 
ye, the only real owner of anything is its commander; and hark ye, my 
conscience is in this ship’s keel.—On deck!59  
When Starbuck hesitates, Ahab threatens him with violence. Now 
Starbuck takes his warning about Ahab abandoning his agency duties to 
the lower layer. He draws down from Ahab’s fiduciary duty of loyalty to 
the Pequod into a deeper conceit warning Ahab about the disloyalty of his 
own soul, and calling him to discipline his corrupted agent back to his 
principal’s purpose: “Thou has outraged, not insulted me sir; but for that 
I ask thee not to beware of Starbuck; thou wouldst but laugh; but let Ahab 
beware of Ahab; beware of thyself, old man.”60 Starbuck is warning the 
principal Ahab that his agent, Ahab, is driving his corporate soul to ruin. 
Melville gets to this powerful ethical invocation through a conception of 
corporate duties. The formulation immediately strikes Ahab as insightful. 
“What’s that he said—Ahab beware of Ahab—there’s something 
there!”61  The call to loyalty—to the ship, and to himself—relieves Ahab 
 
 56. More on Starbuck below, infra text accompanying notes 102-129 (assessing Starbuck’s failure 
to protect the Pequod from Ahab).   
 57. MOBY-DICK, supra note 1, at 547. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. Among corporate law scholars, even proponents of shareholder primacy agree it is a 
mistake to think of shareholders as “owners” of the corporation. See e.g., STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, THE 
NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 127-29 (2008). Rather, it is better to say they 
are the “residual claimants” of the firm, entitled to the full concern of the directors within corporate 
governance. To say shareholders are “owners” obscures more than it reveals, because shareholders have 
none of the traditional indicia of ownership, such as the right to control, or the right to occupy and exclude, 
which actually come closer to the privileges Ahab has on the Pequod.  Starbuck says to remember the 
owners, but Ahab finds it easy to avoid that injunction, since these shareholders are not really anything 
like “owners,” and Ahab himself looks more like an “owner” than they do. If Starbuck had better corporate 
theory, he might have been better able to address Ahab to his responsibilities. As it is, Ahab uses the 
confusion to evade his duty. 
 60. MOBY-DICK, supra note 1, at 548. 
 61. Id. 
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for a moment from his narcissistic designs. He comes on deck and gives 
the order to stop the ship and make repairs: “Furl the t’gallant-sails, and 
close-reef the top-sails, fore and aft . . . up Burton, and break out in the 
main-hold.”62 
Ahab’s renewed fidelity, to the shareholders and to himself, quickly 
passes. He wants it to pass, his madness does anyway, and one way he 
gets it to pass is by forbidding Starbuck from making further reports to 
him. Because no officer can be everywhere at once, corporate law 
imposes on directors and officers a duty to hear reports about the business: 
“the board must make a good faith effort—i.e., try—to put in place a 
reasonable board-level system of monitoring and reporting.”63 To stay 
disloyal and maintain his malign purpose, Ahab has to reject this wise 
dictate of corporate governance that would threaten to make him well.  
Ahab sees, as we can now see, that the deeper purpose of this command 
to hear reports is not just to inform the corporate officer of happenings in 
the business but also to continually make salient the fact of their 
obligations to the firm, lest their mind wander in some other direction. It 
is not enough for Ahab to hear reports and ignore them. The very hearing 
of reports threatens (promises) to stoke fiduciary loyalty and personal 
healing in Ahab. So, Ahab has to stop hearing them. To keep on his selfish 
task Ahab must deeply isolate from others: “in this matter of the whale be 
the front of thy face to me as the palm of this hand—a lipless, unfeatured 
blank.”64  
It is an eerie image, Starbuck’s face as a palm. Ahab makes Starbuck 
mute so he can listen only to the lonely sorrow echoing in his own head.  
This lonesomeness Ahab will now suffer to the very last, for as the 
Pequod finally sinks, Ahab is not even on it with his crew. He is on his 
own whaleboat, watching from afar: “death-glorious ship! Must ye then 
perish, and without me? Am I cut off from the last fond pride of meanest 
shipwrecked captain?”65 Only loyal captains get to go down with the ship. 
Disloyal ones stand alone, watching as it all happens.  
The corporation is the occasion of Ahab’s malfeasance, and facilitates 
it, but the fiduciary law of the corporation also provides an ethics that 
might have saved Ahab from himself, and the rest of the crew too. In this 
insight we can see the hint of a broader outline of personal ethics inspired 
by a corporate conception. Melville is alert to this deeper idea. He sees 
the practical relationship between corporate organization and destruction, 
exploitation, and death; this is clear. But he also sees more deeply in the 
corporation an idea about life that is tender, vitalizing, and rescuing to the 
 
 62. Id. at 547. 
 63. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 821 (Del. 2019).   
 64. MOBY-DICK, supra note 1, at 641. 
 65. Id. at 652.  
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lost soul within Ahab and all of us.  
A REDEEMING CORPORATE CONCEPTION OF THE HUMAN CONDITION  
As the corporation began to take its modern institutional form and exert 
its great economic influence in the nineteenth century, the great literary 
minds of that era began to grasp its spiritual significance too.66 Or, 
following Oscar Wilde, who insisted the sentiments of an age reflect its 
artistic achievements rather than the other way around, let us say instead 
that the spiritual significance of the corporation was first authored by the 
great writers of that day.67 Just as the corporate organizational form was 
not discovered but made, so too is the meaning of the corporation a 
creative, created endeavor.   
One kind of familiar spiritual idea of the corporation sounds in warning 
tones. In his influential 1841 essay Self-Reliance, the American 
transcendentalist Ralph Waldo Emerson rued the turning-over of personal 
independence to social institutions and tried to rally his readers against it. 
To draw out his thesis, Emerson took as metaphor for his foil not ancient, 
obvious curs of individualism like the state, religion, or the family, but 
invoked instead the deadening communalism of the corporation: 
Society everywhere is in conspiracy against the manhood of every one of 
its members. Society is a joint-stock company, in which the members 
agree, for the better securing of his bread to each shareholder, to surrender 
the liberty and culture of the eater. The virtue in most request is conformity. 
Self-reliance is its aversion.68 
Emerson’s theme is not that corporations are deadening to individuality 
but rather that society is deadening to individuality. The corporation is 
invoked as a way of seeing this damnable truth, in the same way that Plato 
examined types of cities in the Republic as a way to more clearly appraise 
truths about the individual human soul.69 In Moby-Dick, published ten 
years after Emerson’s essay, Melville also repeatedly invokes the conceit 
of the corporation to scaffold his conception of the human situation. 
However, Melville found in the corporation, or makes from the 
corporation, a notion of the individual’s relationship to society that is 
 
 66. See JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT HISTORY OF A 
REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 37-79 (2003) (chronicling the emergence of the modern corporation).   
 67. See OSCAR WILDE, The Critic as Artist and The Decay of Lying, in his collection of essays, 
INTENTIONS (BRENTANO’S, 1905) (1891).  About William Shakespeare’s HAMLET (1600), for example, 
Wilde wrote: “The world has become sad because a puppet was once melancholy.” Id. at 63. Great artists 
use archetypes. Geniuses create them.  
 68. RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF RALPH WALDO 
EMERSON 49 (1904). 
 69. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (c. 375). 
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more forgiving, more embracing, than Emerson’s declensionary trope. 
Melville is less interested in independence and more concerned with 
relatedness and mutuality, which he sees as a means through which we 
might transcend the belittlement of lonesomeness and place.  
When Queequeg first told Ishmael of his travels from his Pacific Island 
home to the West, he said his early enthusiasm for learning about the 
bigger world had led him only to the conclusion that “it’s a wicked world 
in all meridians.”70 Just a few pages past this sad confession comes a 
scene that at first seems to buttress the assessment but in the end 
repudiates it. Having met in New Bedford, Ishmael and Queequeg make 
their way by boat to Nantucket, where they will look to join a whaling 
voyage. In that course of passage, they encounter a New England rube 
who racially harasses Queequeg. Unintimidated, Queequeg throws the 
man in the air, flipping him fully over. This does the rube no physical 
damage but draws for Queequeg a warning that he will be put off the boat 
if he does not desist.71  
Soon after, a big wave hits the boat and knocks the rube overboard. 
Unable to spot the man, most on board quickly give him up for drowned. 
But Queequeg jumps into the sea, undertakes a prodigious swim, pulls the 
man up from under the water, and drags him safely back to the boat. In 
striving to explain the conduct he saw in Queequeg, Ishmael finds a 
morality rooted in a corporate conception: “[He] seemed to be saying to 
himself–‘it’s a mutual, joint-stock world, in all meridians. We cannibals 
must help these Christians.’”72 The idea of the corporation here shepherds 
the imagination (Queequeg’s imagination, as imagined by Ishmael, as 
imagined by Melville) to a more cooperative, benevolent conception of 
human relationships, abandoning the “wicked world in all meridians” idea 
that had been patronized without it just a few pages previously.73   
The idea of the corporation facilitates a similar conception of human 
mutuality, as against rank individuality, later in the book. We find Ishmael 
on the Pequod tethered to one end of a “monkey-rope,” the other end of 
which is tied to Queequeg, who is overboard on the body of a dead whale, 
preparing it to be hoisted on deck. The work is dangerous for Queequeg 
and near equally so for Ishmael because of the rope connecting them. If 
the waves or the sharks feasting on the carcass drag Queequeg under, 
Ishmael would be pulled under too. Now, it may be otherwise for a 
monkey, but for a human, to be tied to a monkey-rope is to think about 
what it means to be tied to a monkey-rope. The corporate form aids 
Ishmael’s thinking about it. To forge an understanding of his connection 
 
 70. MOBY-DICK, supra note 1, at 86.  
 71. Id. at 90-92. 
 72. Id. at 92. 
 73. Id. at 86. 
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to Queequeg in this moment, Ishmael flies past friendship, marriage, or 
martial affection, finding the metaphor he seeks in the corporation 
instead: 
So strongly and metaphysically did I conceive of my situation then, that 
while earnestly watching his motions, I seemed distinctly to perceive that 
my own individuality was now merged in a joint stock company of two; 
that my free will had received a mortal wound; and that another’s mistake 
or misfortune might plunge innocent me into unmerited disaster and 
death.74  
Ishmael is led by this corporate conception of his situation to a clearer 
perception of the human condition as a whole, and an understanding of 
the interconnectedness of his own life. At first he saw the artificial device 
tying him to his shipmate’s fate as abhorrent to the proper state of man as 
self-reliant: “[H]ere was a sort of interregnum in Providence; for its even-
handed equity never could have so gross an injustice.”75 But thinking it 
through, he comes to understand the inevitability of human connection: 
I saw that this situation of mine was the precise situation of every mortal 
that breathes; only, in most cases, he, one way or other, has this [conjoined] 
connexion with a plurality of other mortals. If your banker breaks, you 
snap; if your apothecary by mistake sends you poison in your pills, you die. 
. . . [H]andle Queequeg’s monkey-rope heedfully as I would, sometimes he 
jerked it so, that I came very near sliding overboard. Nor could I possibly 
forget that, do what I would, I only had the management of one end of it.76 
Ishmael’s recognition that he is inevitably involved with other people is 
catalyzed by his first conceiving of his situation as being like a joint-stock 
company. He builds from that idea to a mature, accepting understanding 
of the relatedness of all humankind. A superficially more apt business 
vehicle through which Melville might have exemplified a fated union of 
two people would surely have been a “partnership,” especially in 1851, 
when partnerships were the most widespread business organization. But 
the more cutting-edge corporation is the better device for slicing through 
solipsism into the understanding of inescapable entanglement at which 
Ishmael arrives. Partnerships are at-will arrangements.77 They can be 
dissolved whenever a partner wants to quit and walk away, cutting their 
losses. But Ishmael is at no such liberty here. In contrast to partnerships, 
a core feature of the corporation is that once capital has been invested it 
is “locked-in,” and investors cannot demand a corporate dissolution to 
 
 74. Id. at 376. 
 75. Id. at 376. 
 76. Id. at 376. 
 77. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT §31(b) (1914) (“Dissolution is caused . . . by the express will of 
any partner when no definite term or particular undertaking is specified.”). 
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liquidate their own stake.78  
Hard as the rule of capital “lock-in” seems, it is not in the end lamented 
by investors. It is foundational to the efficacy they seek in joining up with 
corporate enterprise. “Lock-in” is the feature of corporate law that enables 
commitment of large amounts of capital to complex long-term projects, 
like building a railroad, putting together a whaling expedition, or creating 
a social media platform.79 Neither does Ishmael rue the depth of his 
interpersonal commitments, nor should we rue our own inescapable 
commitments, for these bring life meaning that far surpasses what could 
be produced in self-reliance. At the start of the book Ishmael was 
depressed, dour, even suicidal.80 But after he meets and becomes involved 
with Queequeg and the Pequod, though he has more at risk, and bears 
great risk over which he has little control (“management”), he is happier 
and more complete than ever he was in self-reliance.81 The abstract nature 
of the corporation gives Melville the right vehicle to build up his 
metaphor for this other abstraction, the idea of human relatedness. These 
abstractions have consequences for our lives that are as real as any brute 
facts, for nothing is so real as U.S. Steel, Amazon, or human connection.   
In literal fact, as opposed to literary idea, Ishmael is free to walk away 
from the Pequod. Capital is locked-in, but labor can exit, and this, as 
reviewed above, is one of the law’s justifications for shareholder primacy 
in corporate governance.82 (Melville was well aware that sailors could 
abandon a whaling voyage, as he had done so twice himself). But Ishmael 
is not concerned here, and I am not concerned here, with locating his 
technical rights and responsibilities within the legal nexus of the firm. 
Instead, he and I are concerned with what sentiment of being the idea of 
the corporation might provide to him, to help him make a gratifying sense 
of himself, and his relationship to others. 
Melville sees in the corporate form a promising way to think about life. 
What is at issue, and what I want to build on here, is not so much the 
material effects of the corporate organization of production, but the 
efficacy of the corporate idea as a means of organizing our self-
conception. I am not arguing that inner-peace and personal power are to 
be found in accepting and internalizing one’s role in the capitalist design. 
Moby-Dick is not a book about a whale. Instead, I am urging us to see 
 
 78. See YOSIFON, CORPORATE FRICTION, supra note 18, at 10-11 (discussing corporate  
lock-in). 
 79. See Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business 
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387 (2003). But see Larry E. Ribstein, Should 
History Lock In Lock-In?, 41 TULSA L. REV. 523 (2006) (criticizing Blair’s account).  
 80. See infra text accompanying notes 87-88.  
 81. See also generally David Yosifon, Corporate Law as an Existential Project, 88 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1801 (2020) (exploring the corporation as a nexus of meaningful relationships for its participants). 
 82. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
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within the corporate conception a workable approach to self-authorship, 
personal ethics, and a meaningful life.  
We are inevitably connected to one another. The corporate idea helps 
Ishmael to see this. Yet the corporate idea is rooted too in the idea of 
willful connection. A core principle of modern corporate law, and the 
agency law upon which it is built, is voluntarism. This was not always so. 
Law is older than liberty, and agency law doctrines once found their 
justification in the status of persons designated into agency relationships. 
Some of the deep roots of agency law, for example, run through the 
poisonous ground of slavery: ancient, feudal, and American.83 The slave 
is subject to the commands of the master because of their socially 
assigned status. The master exercises control over the slave and answers 
for the slaves’ contracts and torts, because their relative status dictates this 
result. The modern precepts of agency law repudiate this legacy by 
making voluntarism not only important but utterly foundational, 
conceptually and doctrinally: “Agency . . . arises when one person (a 
‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent 
shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, 
and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.”84  
Where agency relationships resulted from status, the meaning of those 
relationships was weighty, and weighed down hard on the people who 
were cast in them. To be a master or to be a slave was to be subject to the 
law’s power to dictate who you were and how you related to others. 
Agency law was then an agent of Roman privilege, or white supremacy. 
Where, however, the agency relationship is formed through assent, the 
core meaning of the legal relationship abides in the intentionality of the 
association. Indeed, at the deepest level, voluntarism is not really the 
justification for the system, it is the purpose of the system. Corporations 
are desirable social institutions chiefly because they are occasions for 
intentionality. This, more than whale oil or widgets, is the most important 
thing that the corporate form produces.  
Moby-Dick takes the principle of voluntarism seriously. Queequeg, the 
Pequod’s master harpooner and friend to Ishmael, was born into a status-
based society. His father and grandfather before him were kings of their 
island nation in the South Pacific, and Queequeg was also predestined to 
 
 83. See generally Barbara Abatino et al., Depersonalization of Business in Ancient Rome, 31 
OXFORD J. OF L. STUD. 365 (2011) (discussing the relationship between slavery and agency law in Ancient 
Rome); Jenny B. Wahl, American Slavery and the Path of the Law, 20 SOC. SCI. HIST. 281 (1996) 
(examining, inter alia, connections between American slavery and developments in modern agency law). 
 84. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. L. INST. 2006) (emphasis added). Agency law 
is at the heart of corporate governance law, and the conceit of voluntarism is at the heart of prevailing 
modern justifications for corporate designs. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, 
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 12 (1991) (“[T]he corporation is a voluntary 
adventure.”). 
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be king. But prescription is an unacceptable social description. Born a 
subject or born a king, a person born for being rather than becoming is 
closer to death than they are to living.85 Queequeg renounces his 
hereditary throne in order to redeem the only crown worth wearing: 
volunteer. He leaves the status realm, canoes out to a whaling boat that is 
sailing by, and signs on. Queequeg gives up his island paradise with its 
cannibalistic delights for the cramped grind of the whaling ship. Because 
it is better to reign in hell than to serve in heaven.86  
Ishmael is also a volunteer. When we meet him in the book’s opening 
passage, he tells us that a gloom had unaccountably come upon him. 
There is passivity in his self-description. His mouth was growing grim, 
and he found himself “involuntarily pausing before coffin warehouses, 
and bringing up the rear of every funeral I meet.”87 He is depressed, we 
would say, or unwell. His “hypos” were beginning to “get . . . an upper 
hand” of him.88 Ishmael knows that the only way for him to counteract 
this melancholic, existential angst of being human is with the antidote of 
becoming human: volunteering, acting, taking command of his situation. 
For Ishmael this means going to the sea. Not so much to the sea, in fact, 
as to the ship. Ishmael escapes his dour drifting life by volunteering into 
relationships, with Queequeg, and with the nexus of relationships that is 
the Pequod. 
Now, we must not, in a romance of voluntarism, lose our heads to the 
abusive, exploitative labor conditions in the nineteenth-century whale 
fishery, the twenty-first century gig-economy, or anywhere else. The 
indecency in capitalism has too often been exonerated by the ideological 
seduction of choice fetishism. But neither can we allow the sordidness of 
such mesmerism to make us cynical to truths we want to revere. The 
reason we are on guard against the toxic use of voluntarism is because we 
venerate the idea in its unadulterated aspect, which is real. We should take 
from corporate law’s focus on voluntarism a reflection and reminder of 
how important it really is to us, rather than allowing its fake use by 
ideologists to subvert our sense of its importance.  
 
 
 85. “From the fool’s gold mouthpiece the hollow horn / Plays wasted words, proves to warn / That 
he not busy being born is busy dying.” Bob Dylan, It’s Alright Ma (I’m Only Bleeding), on BRINGING IT 
ALL BACK HOME (Columbia Records, 1965). 
             86.   This is to say something specific about the human spirit, but it is not to say anything in 
particular about nineteenth-century Pacific Island culture, about which Melville was surely mostly 
ignorant. See generally, Geoffrey Sanhorn, Whence Come You, Queequeg?, 77 AM. LIT. 227 (2005) 
(arguing that Melville based Queequeg on the life of a real South Pacific whaler named Te Pehi Kupe and 
assessing nineteenth-century literary treatment of Pacific Island culture). Melville’s first book, TYPEE: A 
PEEP AT POLYNESIAN LIFE (1846), was based on his experiences on the Marquesas Islands after deserting 
a whaling voyage in 1842. 
 87. MOBY-DICK, supra note 1, at 27 (emphasis added).  
 88. Id.  
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Both Queequeg and Ishmael are serious about what voluntarism means 
to a meaningful life. They are not cowed by industrial conditions into 
giving up that truth, and we should not be either. Ishmael knows he is 
coming in for some fairly intense bossing around in signing up with a 
whaling firm. He explains that, deeply speaking, there is no way around 
this:  
Who ain’t a slave? Tell me that. Well, then, however the old sea-captains 
may order me about—however they may thump and punch me about, I 
have the satisfaction of knowing that it is all right; that everybody else is 
one way or other served in much the same way—either in a physical or 
metaphysical point of view, that is; and so the universal thump is passed 
round, and all hands should rub each other’s shoulder-blades, and be 
content.89  
More than personal explanation, this is existential instruction. The truth 
about ourselves, the meaning of our voluntarism, must be found within 
the contradiction, the seeming contradiction, between having to serve and 
being free. Since you are sure to serve in some way, do not shy from the 
liberating, self-making gusto that comes in volunteering to it. The rule of 
law, the free society, the just society, neither alleviates us from the burden 
nor robs us of the opportunity of serving somebody. To be free is not to 
choose whether or not to serve—as to that, you have no choice. To be free 
is to choose how you will serve, and what it will mean to you.  
As the philosopher John Paul Sartre diagnosed it, more (or worse) than 
being free to choose, we are compelled to it. “I am condemned to be free,” 
Sartre wrote.90 To be human is to confront contingency, there is no exit 
to necessity. The roughest cannibal must know that he could be a 
vegetarian. He has no choice but to choose cannibalism, or not. Ahab 
could quit chasing the White Whale and be loyal to the stockholders 
instead. The lying lawyer can stop or keep doing it. The conscript is not a 
stone or a horse, they could rebel, or try to escape, or acquiesce, but they 
cannot do nothing, because they are inescapably free to do as they will. 
The body cannot always be moved as we desire, but we cannot escape the 
freedom to determine our attitude towards the situation of our existence 
and how we will behave within the domain of freedom that confronts us. 
We want to stomp out slavery, rescue the poor, and end invidious 
discrimination not to make people free, but because human beings are 
free, and it is an abomination to institutionalize any other version of the 
 
 89. Id. at 30. Ishmael understands that although he may be “living under another name” (“Call me 
Ishmael,”  Id. at 27), he’s “still gonna have to serve somebody.” Bob Dylan, Gotta Serve Somebody, on 
SLOW TRAIN COMING (Columbia Records, 1979). 
 90. JEAN PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS 567 (1943, 1992) (“I am condemned to exist 
forever beyond my essence, beyond the causes and motives of my act. . . . [W]e are not free to cease being 
free.”). 
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truth. We do not create the principle of freedom: we realize it, we redeem 
it, and we ramify it. Seeing this conceptually, in law and art, can improve 
your vision and acuity for freedom in every aspect of your life. The 
corporate conception of voluntarism draws our attention to this truth, and 
makes it unavoidable. 
But is this how it is or only how it seems? In the inhalation Moby-Dick 
centers and celebrates the reality of human willfulness. In the exhalation 
it is alert to the worrisome reverse: situational pressures in our social 
environment combine with unseen features of our psychology to compel 
our thinking and behavior in ways we only mistakenly perceive as freely 
chosen.91 We seem to act but may be merely acting. This is the Janus-
truth of the human condition. Corporate theory invites us to elevate our 
conception of voluntarism and its meaning in our life, but the very 
emphasis that it puts on the idea leads us to complicate our understanding 
of it, and leaves us rightly questioning the design of the corporation that 
inspired the line of thought.   
I want to pursue this problem by excavating a crucial ambiguity in a 
core corporate word: “agency.” It is strange that sometimes words mean 
both what they mean and also the opposite of what they mean. Sanction 
means to allow, yet sanction means to punish for having done something 
forbidden. Stay somehow means both to continue and to stop. Bolt means 
to secure something from coming loose; it also means to flee fast from 
something. Linguists call these “contranyms,” or “Janus words.”92 The 
phenomena remains shrouded in mystery, but certainly seems, or 
sometimes can be made to seem, to hint at something profound.  The word 
“agency” is a contranym. We might see in its two-faces not random 
variation, but some kind of sublime incantation. We say something has 
agency when we mean it acts intentionally with its own ends in mind. Yet 
an agent is someone who works on behalf of and subject to the control of 
another person. Again and again in everyday usage we trip over these 
contradictory senses of the word. This linguistic knot is expressive of a 
core ambivalence we have about ourselves.93   
 
 91. See generally Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 29 (reviewing psychological studies that assess 
this outlook). 
 92. See David-Antoine Williams, Poetic Antagonyms, 37 THE COMPARATIST 169 (2013) (poetic 
analysis of contranyms).  According to Williams, “[t]hough some have described traditions of thought 
regarding antithetical or self-divided words, not until recently have they been discussed in English, and 
almost not at all as literary phenomena.” Id. The phenomena does not appear to have been directly 
addressed in legal theory, heretofore.  
 93. In a brief essay from 1910, Sigmund Freud discussed with enthusiasm the (then) recent 
discovery of contranyms in Ancient Egyptian. See SIGMUND FREUD, THE ANTITHETICAL MEANING OF 
PRIMAL WORDS (READ BOOKS, LTD, 2013) (1910). Freud noted the parallels between contranyms and 
representations in dreams, which often seem both to mean one thing and also the very opposite. Finding 
contranyms in the earliest recorded human language suggested to Freud that they were related to the 
emergence of “concepts” in human thinking itself. He speculated that better understanding the mysteries 
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The ideas and language of agency law give figure to this ambivalence 
within the text of Moby-Dick. A topsy-turvy confusion about who is an 
agent in command and who is a commanded agent recurs throughout the 
novel. Nowhere is the ambiguity more precisely expressed than with 
respect to the whale itself. When first revealing his intention to hunt Moby 
Dick, Ahab says he does not know whether the White Whale is itself the 
malevolent force that goads him, or whether the whale is merely serving 
that force. Ahab cuts through this uncertainty by making it irrelevant: “I 
see in him outrageous strength, with an inscrutable malice sinewing it. 
That inscrutable thing is chiefly what I hate; and be the white whale agent, 
or be the white whale principal, I will wreak that hate upon him.”94  
While unsure about the status of Moby Dick, Ahab himself at first 
expresses no doubt in the principle of his own agency. Starbuck, the First 
Mate, warns Ahab off his quest, saying it is blasphemy to seek vengeance 
on an animal that acted out of instinct (i.e., blasphemy to endow agency 
to a mere agent of impulse).95 But Ahab is no agent of piety, nor servant 
even to any general notion of fair play—his agency is unbound, so he 
says: 
Talk not to me of blasphemy, man; I’d strike the sun if it insulted me. For 
could the sun do that, then could I do the other; since there is ever a sort of 
fair play herein . . . . But not my master, man, is even that fair play. Who’s 
over me? Truth hath no confines.96 
But since unconfined truth encompasses ambiguity, Ahab’s doubt about 
whether the White Whale is principal or agent soon swims round to stove 
his own self-conception. As we have seen, it is corporate law which serves 
in the novel to introduce this doubt.97 After Starbuck’s “let Ahab beware 
Ahab” warning, Ahab becomes aware that something other than his own 
principal purpose may be driving his pursuit of the whale. Thereafter, 
Ahab is haunted not just by Moby Dick, but by doubts about the basis of 
his own behavior. Sometimes Ahab thinks he is an agent, other times he 
suspects that he is merely an agent to some other source of command. The 
captain of the Samuel Enderby, who had lost an arm to Moby Dick, gives 
 
of contranyms might aid in figuring-out how dreams work. To pursue this further here “would be to dive 
deeper than Ishmael can go,” MOBY-DICK, supra note 1, at 229. But I will note that Ahab, confused as to 
the meaning of his agency, has bad dreams. See MOBY-DICK, supra note 1, at 163, 245 (“exhausting and 
intolerably vivid dreams”).   
 94. MOBY-DICK, supra note 1, at 203. This is doctrinally sound, for one operating on behalf of a 
hidden principal is liable themselves for business they undertake with third-persons, be they in fact only 
an agent of that principal. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 6.03 (AM. L. INST. 2006); see also 
generally, Martin Schiff, The Problem of the Undisclosed Principal and How It Affects Agent and Third 
Party, 1984 DET. C. L. REV. 47 (1984). 
 95. Id.  
 96. Id.  
 97. See supra text accompanying notes 56-62. 
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Ahab prudent advice as to their mutual nemesis: “he’s best left alone.” 
Ahab sees the wisdom in this but sees too that he is powerless to follow 
it. “He is,” Ahab says, “But he will still be hunted, for all that. What is 
best let alone, that accursed thing is not always what least allures. He’s 
all a magnet!”98 And then before the final scenes, before the actual 
confrontation with Moby Dick, we find the Pequod’s captain alone, 
looking out on the cold sea, desperately asking: “Is Ahab, Ahab?”99   
As human psychology will have it, the greater the suggestion that the 
White Whale is pulling him, the more radically does Ahab assert that it is 
he who is chasing the whale. To satisfy his motive to self-affirm, to view 
himself as in control, Ahab tries to overwhelm the constant hints of 
compulsion with the sound and fury of self-assertion. Shouting into a 
typhoon, he proclaims his willfulness against the unseen force he 
identifies as tormenting him. Even as the awful inscrutable devouring 
universe seems intent on controlling Ahab, Ahab refuses the call to 
agency, insisting instead that he is an agent:  
No fearless fool now fronts thee. I own [i.e., I acknowledge] thy speechless, 
placeless power; but to the last gasp of my earthquake life will dispute its 
unconditional, unintegral mastery in me. In the midst of the personified 
impersonal, a personality stands here. Though but a point at best; 
whencesoe’er I came; wheresoe’er I go; yet while I earthly live, the queenly 
personality lives in me, and feels her royal rights. . . . Thou canst blind; but 
I can then grope. Thou canst consume; but I can then be ashes.100 
Ahab taunts the divine with this insistence upon his own autonomy. But 
even in this moment, Ahab cannot escape the contranymic mystery of 
agency, and he projects those confusion bolts even at God, saying that he 
senses, and God must sense too, that there is some force controlling 
God—that God too is agent and not Agent:  
Thou knowest not how came ye, hence callest thyself unbegotten. . . . . 
There is some unsuffusing thing beyond thee, thou clear spirit, to whom all 
thy eternity is but time, all thy creativeness mechanical. . . . Oh, thou 
foundling fire, thou hermit immemorial, thou too hast thy incommunicable 
riddle.101 
 By privileging voluntarism, corporate law compels us to interrogate 
what voluntarism really means. In so doing, we are reminded of why we 
revere the idea, and are reminded of why we are doubtful about it. But 
corporate law is finally no philosophical inquiry, and like Ishmael going 
to the sea we are intent on living our lives, not just thinking them through. 
 
 98. Id. at 511. 
 99. Id.  at 622. 
 100. Id. at 580-581. 
 101. Id. at 581. 
29
Yosifon: Moby-Dick as Corporate Catastrophe
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021
2021] MOBY DICK AS CORPORATE CATASTROPHE 401 
Even as it sustains our attention to the deep mysteries, the discourse of 
corporate law also provides practical wisdom for the pursuit of meaning, 
excellence, and vitality which must be undertaken in the midst of doubt.   
The corporate association is forged in the self-authoring brio of 
voluntarism. Then, within the corporate association, the law prescribes to 
its agents the imperative to go, to serve the purpose of your association, 
with verve. The statute says: “[t]he business and affairs of every 
corporation . . . shall be managed” by the board of directors.102 Corporate 
agents cannot be passive; they must act. This is an idea about life that is 
rescuing, it is an imperative to salutary willfulness that cures the “pain of 
idleness.”103 This corporate instruction to act is bound by an obligation 
not to act selfishly but rather to act selflessly. Act, with imaginative 
loyalty to the life projects with which you are engaged. This is an escape 
from degenerative solipsism into creative involvement with the world. 
Thus do our obligations become opportunities to transcend our own 
limitations and become excellent in our lives beyond those 
responsibilities. I am not suggesting dedicating your life to the pursuit of 
some corporation’s bottom line, not any more than Melville is telling a 
story about a whale hunt. I am urging us to see within the corporate idea, 
with Melville’s aid, the working-out of a framework for personal ethics 
that can produce meaning worth having.   
COUNSELING THE CORPORATE CONSCIENCE:  STARBUCK’S FAILURE104 
“Where were the lawyers?”105 The question is repeated as often as 
there are new rounds of corporate disasters that could have been averted 
if corporate lawyers had been on the forward-deck doing their duty. I want 
to turn now to the role of the lawyer in averting or facilitating corporate 
catastrophe by assessing the failure of Mr. Starbuck, the First Mate, who 
 
 102. 8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 141(a).  
 103. BOB DYLAN, Every Grain of Sand, on SHOT OF LOVE (Columbia Records 1981). 
 104. Melville named his Starbuck in homage to a venerable American whaling family, the 
Starbucks of Nantucket. The Starbucks coffee corporation was named after Melville’s character in some 
sense, although the inspiration appears to have been more about the relatability of word sounds than any 
characterological connection to the Pequod’s First Mate. See HOWARD SCHULTZ, POUR YOUR HEART 
INTO IT: HOW STARBUCKS BUILT A COMPANY ONE CUP AT A TIME 32-33 (1999).  
 105. This familiar refrain is often connected to Judge Stanley Sporkin’s opinion in Lincoln Sav. & 
Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901 (D.D.C. 1990).  That opinion says plenty about the lapse of lawyers, 
but the oft-repeated line is actually a paraphrase of Sporkin’s indictment of lawyers, accountants, and 
other experts generally: “Where were these professionals?” Id. at 920. See also, Ed Hendricks & Mary 
Berkheiser, Where Were the Lawyers?, 18 LITIG. 30 (1992) (surveying instances of corporate misconduct 
that corporate lawyers failed to prevent); Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral 
Inquiry into Lawyers' Responsibility for Clients’ Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75 (1993); Lawrence A. 
Hamermesh, Who Let You into the House?, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 359, 386 (2012). 
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I will reasonably call the General Counsel of the Pequod.106  
Corporate lawyers must comport themselves to the idea that they serve 
the corporate entity and not the natural persons who are in charge of 
running it. This is hard. It is hard for the same reason that it is easy for a 
corporate officer to think of the business as their own: the corporation is 
abstract, but everyone can see and hear the CEO, and everyone does what 
the CEO says. It requires an active ethical imagination to keep the lawyer 
thinking straight about their duties to the firm, and acting accordingly.  
The rules of professional conduct make clear that if a corporate lawyer 
knows that an officer within their firm is behaving in a way that threatens 
to harm the firm, the lawyer must act to protect the corporation.107 
  Starbuck is a stiff. A by-the-book man, but not much of a reader of 
them: “Starbuck was no crusader after perils; in him courage was not a 
sentiment; but a thing simply useful to him.”108 This is good enough in 
the ordinary course, but it is inadequate to the extraordinary. We create 
corporations because we want extraordinary coordination, extraordinary 
production, and extraordinary consumption. We want corporate power 
and the accomplished use of that power. To have this power we must, as 
part of the corporate project, expand too the ethical capacities of lawyers 
beyond the ordinary. A dinghy crew might get by with a man of ordinary 
courage as general counsel. But a large corporation, capable of fantastic 
wrongdoing, must have a lawyer of fantastic ethical impulse to guide it, 
or if need be, to grind-up its gears.   
At the “all hands” meeting where Ahab makes plain his intention to 
hunt Moby Dick instead of pursuing the ship’s stated business purpose, 
only Starbuck offers any resistance to the plan. In fact, Starbuck raises a 
momentary doubt as to whether it even was that particular whale that took 
 
 106. They may try to take away my literary license for this pro hoc vice construction of Starbuck, 
but I will risk it.  In defense, I will cite to at least some dicta in John Huston’s estimable film-adaptation 
of Moby-Dick (MGM 1956), which has Starbuck pulling a law-book off a cabin shelf and reading to his 
fellow officers about their rights and duties in the face of Ahab’s misconduct (a scene which does not 
appear in the book).  To draw out the lessons for corporate lawyering that can be seen in Moby-Dick, I 
deliberately decline to assess Starbuck’s behavior in terms of nineteenth-century admiralty law. In general, 
it seems that admiralty law requires tremendous deference on the part of all shipboard subordinates to the 
commands of the captain, except where those orders are clearly unlawful or unreasonable. See Cyane v. 
Johnson, 1 Alaska Fed. 1, 2 (D. Cal. 1870) (“In all cases, obedience is the first duty of the seaman; and it 
is only when the command is clearly unlawful, or the duty exacted is plainly unreasonable and 
unnecessary, that a refusal to obey can be for a moment countenanced.”). Cf. MOBY-DICK, supra note 1, 
at 480 (“Never jump from a boat . . . except—but all the rest was indefinite, as the soundest advice ever 
is.”). 
 107. See MODEL RULE PRO. CONDUCT 1.13(a)-(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021) (“A lawyer . . . retained 
by an organization represents the organization . . . . If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer 
. . . associated with the organization is engaged in action . . . that is likely to result in substantial injury to 
the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the 
organization”). 
 108. MOBY-DICK, supra note 1, at 149. 
31
Yosifon: Moby-Dick as Corporate Catastrophe
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021
2021] MOBY DICK AS CORPORATE CATASTROPHE 403 
Ahab’s leg in the first place. “Captain Ahab, I have heard of Moby Dick—
but it was not Moby Dick that took off thy leg?”109 The Captain snaps 
back: “‘Who told thee that?’ cried Ahab; then pausing, ‘Aye, Starbuck; 
aye, my hearties all round; it was Moby Dick that dismasted me.’”110 
After that, the rest of the firm accepts the Captain’s “definition of the 
situation.”111   
Starbuck tries to dissuade Ahab, first with appeal to self-interest: “How 
many barrels will thy vengeance yield thee even if thou gettest it, Captain 
Ahab? it will not fetch thee much in our Nantucket market.”112 But Ahab 
has already done the cost-benefit analysis, and he prefers blood to oil: 
“my vengeance will fetch a great premium here!” he says as he smites his 
chest.113  Starbuck also appeals to morality and religion to try to get Ahab 
to stop: “Vengeance on a dumb brute! . . . To be enraged with a dumb 
thing, Captain Ahab, seems blasphemous.”114  Ahab (like many moderns) 
is not God-fearing: “Talk not to me of blasphemy, man.”115 As we have 
seen, the only thing that moves Ahab for a moment is when Starbuck 
appeals to fiduciary scriptures, not just the black letter of it, but deeply, 
first reminding Ahab that he is being disloyal to the ship’s owners, and 
then excavating an idea that in hunting Moby Dick the vengeful Ahab is 
being disloyal to himself.116 That worked. But Starbuck does not sustain 
that approach. Had he done more he might have gotten through to Old 
Thunder. Had Starbuck focused his own self-conception deeply in terms 
of his fiduciary obligations, he might have been better nourished to the 
task that befell him and might have saved the crew, the ship, and himself. 
But Starbuck’s idea of duty is too thin, and he does not go down deep 
enough, or long enough, to get what is really needed.   
Ahab pulls out every trick in the corrupt CEO’s handbook to bend his 
General Counsel to his will. He ridicules: “Take off thine eye! more 
intolerable than fiends’ glarings is a doltish stare!”117 And flatters: “the 
best lance out of all Nantucket, surely he will not hang back.”118 He uses 
social-proof to pull Starbuck to his purpose, pointing out that the other 
ship’s officers are with him: “See Stubb! he laughs! See yonder Chilian! 
he snorts to think of it. Stand up amid the general hurricane, thy one tost 
 
 109. Id. at 202. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 145 (1974) 
(classic study of the mechanics of psychological influence). 
 112. MOBY-DICK, supra note 1, at 202. 
 113. Id. at 203.  
 114. Id. at 202. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See supra, text accompanying notes 61-71 (discussing Ahab’s own agency problem).   
 117. MOBY-DICK, supra note 1, at 203. 
 118. Id. 
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sapling cannot, Starbuck!”119 Ahab primes the dissonance avoidance 
mechanisms standing at the ready in Starbuck’s mind. He urges the First 
Mate to see the hunt for the White Whale as actually in keeping with the 
ordinary business of the ship: “‘Tis but to help strike a fin; no wondrous 
feat for Starbuck. What is it more?”120 As Ahab pressures him Starbuck 
falls into silence, no good habit for corporate counsel facing executive 
misconduct. Ahab then goads him: “it is thy silence, then, that voices 
thee. . . . Starbuck now is mine.”121 
It takes a special hubris for an executive to scheme as wildly as Ahab, 
but just common human frailty for a corporate lawyer like Starbuck to let 
him get away with it. Subordinate to a charismatic leader, who has the 
frothy allegiance of the crew, Starbuck is motivated to find reasons not to 
act against the tide sweeping over the ship. Being creative and intelligent, 
he is able to find those reasons. He sees that something is seriously wrong 
but decides that there is still plenty of time before he needs to act, if indeed 
he needs to act at all. Maybe the problem will work itself out. The harm 
may potentially be great, but maybe it is not very likely to occur after all. 
They are perhaps not likely to even find Moby Dick out there in the vast 
ocean: “Yet is there hope. Time and tide flow wide. The hated whale has 
the round watery world to swim in, as the small gold-fish has its glassy 
globe.”122 The bullish optimism bias steers Starbuck to figure that things 
will probably work out alright, as things tend to: “[h]is heaven-insulting 
purpose, God may wedge aside.”123 Too many fiduciaries – too many 
general counsels – lose the opportunity to stop festering misconduct by a 
corporate leader before it metastasizes throughout the firm they are 
charged to protect, hoping instead that the problem will go away.124 
Starbuck does not admit to himself what any serious ethical person must 
know: a person who goes looking for Moby Dick will find him. 
 The first time the men of the Pequod lower for a whale hunt, long 
before they find Moby Dick, they discover an extra crew that Ahab had 
stowed-away to aid his secret mission. If one squints, the scene can look 
enough like normal business to be treated like it. Ahab himself in lowering 
with this crew, we are told, looks the same as he has in a thousand 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. For touchstone scholarship on cognitive and motivational biases in corporate lawyering, see, 
e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The Epistemology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases and 
Organizational Behavior, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 629 (1997); Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The 
Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233 (2003); Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating 
the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 1004 (2005); Catherine Gage 
O’Grady, Wrongful Obedience and the Professional Practice of Law, 19 J.L. BUS. & ETH. 9 (2013). 
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lowerings before. The stowaway crew is, after all, pulling alongside him 
and the others in the hunt. In his dissonance avoidance, Starbuck goes so 
far as to conclude that Ahab’s opportunism might in the end be profitable. 
Stubb, a junior officer, asks Starbuck what he thinks of the stowaways. 
Starbuck jibber-jabbers:  
A sad business, Mr. Stubb! (seethe her, seethe her, my lads!) but never 
mind, Mr. Stubb, all for the best. . . . There’s hogsheads of sperm ahead, 
Mr. Stubb, and that’s what ye came for. (Pull, my boys!) Sperm, sperm’s 
the play! This at least is duty; duty and profit hand in hand.125  
And just like that, all can seem right enough to Starbuck. He tries to focus 
on his work as a way of dealing with the looming institutional disaster. 
As if he might get away with being blameless when what is called for is 
to be brave.   
 Starbuck is overwhelmed by the cult of personality threatening the 
firm to the point where he overestimates the power of the CEO standing 
in the way of his duty. Starbuck claims that he does not know what to do 
about Ahab, that he is confused. But there is no cause for confusion.  
[I]s there no other way? no lawful way?—Make him a prisoner to be taken 
home? What! hope to wrest this old man’s living power from his own living 
hands? Only a fool would try it. Say he were pinioned even; knotted all 
over with ropes and hawsers; chained down to ring-bolts on this cabin 
floor; he would be more hideous than a caged tiger, then. I could not endure 
the sight; could not possibly fly his howlings; all comfort, sleep itself, 
inestimable reason would leave me on the long intolerable voyage.126 
This is the sum of corporate counsel’s cowardice. It would make him 
uncomfortable. It is not that he worries that he is unauthorized to act. And 
what to do about the misconduct is not so hard to figure out. He could try 
to rally the men, or just a few of them, to join him. Ahab has a salty 
strength no doubt, but he is past 50 years old, and he has only one leg.127 
Or Starbuck could take a whale boat and set sail for help from other 
whalers.128 It is actually not hard to imagine what he could do. But he 
cannot, does not, bring himself to do it. Starbuck could have prevented 
the sinking of the Pequod. He knows right from wrong, and he wants to 
stop the evil he identifies, but he does not. What is missing is the oomph 
to carry him from what he knows he must do to actually doing it.  
 
 125. MOBY-DICK, supra note 1, at 264-65. 
 126. Id. at 589. 
 127. Compare Jack London’s Wolf Larson, who does have a nearly superhuman strength, and is 
able to single-handedly put down open-mutiny by his crew. See London, THE SEA WOLF, supra note 16.  
 128. Corporate lawyers, like all lawyers, are bound by a duty of confidentiality. But under the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, a lawyer who knows that a corporate officer is bringing harm on 
the firm by illegal or fraudulent conduct is permitted to report-out this misconduct, in order to protect their 
client, the firm.  See MODEL RULE PRO. CONDUCT 1.13(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021). 
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A core text in the study of “situational influence” in human thinking 
and behavior is Stanley Milgram’s seminal experiments on obedience to 
authority. You know about those experiments like you know about Moby-
Dick, whether you have read them or not. Milgram brought people into 
his lab and demonstrated that they would obediently administer electric 
shocks to a “student” in a learning experiment when directed to do so by 
a person in authority, and they would escalate the shocks even with the 
student crying out in pain and asking for it to stop (the “student” was a 
collaborator and was not actually shocked, but the “teacher” thought it 
was real).129 A most crucial finding of Milgram’s was that, for the most 
part, those subjects knew they were acting wrongly. They knew they 
should not be doing what they were doing, but they did it anyway. 
Milgram said it clearly: “these subjects were not blindly obeying the 
experimenter’s commands: They were seriously conflicted but unable to 
transform an intellectual, moral conviction into action.”130 It is not that 
Starbuck’s motivated reasoning runs so deep that it changes his 
assessment of what he should do. Rather, it puts just enough doubt into 
the picture to keep him from doing what he otherwise knows he must do.   
 Earlier we saw that Ahab’s last sorrow is that he is denied the captain’s 
“fond pride” of going down with the ship (he watches it from a whale 
boat).131 Starbuck’s last ignominy is that he is at the helm when Moby 
Dick finally smashes and sinks the Pequod. When a corrupted CEO’s 
nefarious doings are finally fully revealed, and the festering harm to the 
firm can no longer be denied, it may often be the salted general counsel 
who is given hasty field promotion to steward over the firm’s final 
undoing.132 But there is no fond pride in going down this way for 
Starbuck, for he too is the reason that the ship is sunk. He did not protect 
it from Moby Dick, because he did not protect it from Ahab. Chisel 
Starbuck’s name with the rest on the marbled memorial in the Lost 
Seaman’s Chapel, but scrub his name from the rolls of the Massachusetts 
Bar.   
 
 129. See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, 
Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 150-162 (2003) 
(reviewing Milgram’s experiments). 
 130. See Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 1004 (2005) (quoting Milgram). 
 131. See supra text accompanying note 71.  
 132. Instances abound in the business press and are noted in scholarship and cases. See e.g., 
Christine Hurt, The Undercivilization of Corporate Law, 33 J. CORP. L. 361 (2008) (“prosecutors indicted 
Richard T. Nelson, the company's general counsel who was appointed interim CEO for approximately a 
month following the May 6, 2002 announcement that the company would restate its finances.”). 
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CONCLUSION 
Big winds toss both to and fro. Melville is unembarrassed to present 
the corporation in contradictory aspect and we should take instruction 
from that. Dogmatic celebrations or condemnations are for paperback 
writers. Moby-Dick understands corporate corruption, alienation, and 
exploitation, and it sees depth, relatedness, and promise of transcendence 
in the corporate idea. This is a truthful, full telling, that can guide 
assessment both of prevailing institutional arrangements and perennial 
existential problems.   
We can enchant our conception of the corporation and find in it an 
invitation to a deeper understanding of ourselves and a better living of our 
lives. I have been concerned here with finding meaning not in our lived-
experience of corporate conduct, but in our imagination of what the 
corporation is and what about life it describes. Art and literature can 
inspire this imagination. A book like Moby-Dick can be as important to 
our conception of the corporation as is the Delaware corporate code, 
Chancery’s next opinion, the quarterly statements of Amazon, or 
Google’s next Super Bowl commercial. It can help us to understand how 
corporate law works, and make for us what corporate law means. 
In a remarkable, challenging passage, Ishmael reflects on Starbuck’s 
shortcomings but insists that he would not have written the book if its 
only utility was to expose human frailty:  
Men may seem detestable as joint stock-companies and nations; knaves, 
fools, and murderers there may be; men may have mean and meagre faces; 
but man, in the ideal, is so noble and so sparkling, such a grand and glowing 
creature, that over any ignominious blemish in him all his fellows should 
run to throw their costliest robes.133 
We know about the lout in us. We recognize too well Ahab’s selfish 
madness and Starbuck’s cowardice. But we know deep inside too that this 
is not the last word about us and not the best word. Yet, where are we to 
find the material with which to stitch together a robe to throw over 
ourselves that could bring-out our proper sparkle? I think we may find 
some useful cloth in that same corporate shroud in which we see the image 
of our self-condemnation. Had Starbuck or Ahab found the redemptive 
instruction available in fiduciary scriptures, either of them could have 
saved that ship, the men aboard, and themselves. The corporate ideas of 
mutuality, care, deference, loyalty, and good faith might help us make the 
robe we need to cover-up our meagerness and become more than what we 
were.  Attired in such purple, we might then turn our attention back to the 
corporate form itself, and make it function better too. 
 
 133. MOBY-DICK, supra note 1, at 149. 
36
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss2/1
